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Abstract
Given a proﬁle of preferences on a set of alternatives, a majority
relation is a complete binary relation that agrees with the strict pref-
erence of a strict majority of these preferences whenever such strict
strict majority is observed. We show that a majority binary relation
is, among all conceivable binary relations, the most representative of
the proﬁle of preferences from which it emanates. We deﬁne "the most
representative" to mean "the closest in the aggregate". This requires
a deﬁnition of what it means for a pair of preferences to be closer
to each other then another. We assume that this deﬁnition takes the
form of a distance function deﬁned over the set of all conceivable pref-
erences. We identify a necessary and suﬃcient condition for such a
distance to be minimized by the preference of the majority. This con-
dition requires the distance to be additive with respect to a plausible
notion of compromise between preferences. The well-known Kemeny
distance between preference does satisfy this property. We also pro-
vide a characterization of the class of distances satisfying this property
as numerical representations of a primitive qualitative proximity rela-
tion between preferences.
JEL classiﬁcation: D71, D72
Keywords: preferences, majority, dissimilarity, distance, aggregation.
1 Introduction
The "preference of the majority" is indisputably one of the most widely
used and discussed social preference. Yet, the normative justiﬁcations in
favour of the "majoritarian" way of aggregating individual preferences are
surprisingly thin. An important such justiﬁcation has been provided by May
∗Department of Economics, Ashoka University.
†Centre de Sciences Humaines, Delhi & Aix-Marseille School of Economics, 2, Dr APJ
Abdul Kalam Road, 11 0011 Delhi, India.
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(1952), who proves that when there are only two alternatives, the majority
rule is the only mapping of individual preferences into social ranking that
is decisive, egalitarian, neutral and positively responsive. A well-known lim-
itation of the majority rule, at least since Condorcet in the late XVIIIth
century, is its failure to satisfy transitivity. This limitation is obviously not
addressed by May (1952) who considers only the case where two alterna-
tives are concerned. In the discussion of his famous impossibility theorem,
Arrow (1963) himself (see e.g. p. 101), recognizes that the generalization to
more than two alternatives of May’s results was not easy. Papers who have
done so include Dasgupta and Maskin (2008) and the recent work by Horan,
Osborne, and Sanver (2018).
In this paper, we propose an alternative justiﬁcation for the Majority rule
than that developed in the May (1952) tradition. Speciﬁcally, we show that
the preference of the majority qualiﬁes, in a somewhat strong sense, as being
representative of the collection of preferences from which it emanates. The
notion of representativeness on which our argument is constructed is that
underlying the choice of several measures of "central tendency" in classical
statistics. A common justiﬁcation indeed for the mean of a set of numbers
as a "representative statics" for these numbers is that the mean minimizes
the sum of the squares of the diﬀerences between itself and the represented
numbers. Similarly, the median of a set of numbers - another widely used
measure of "central tendency" - is commonly justiﬁed by the fact that it
minimizes the sum of the absolute values of those same diﬀerence, while the
mode minimizes a somewhat more degenerate distance between numbers
that is 1 if the numbers diﬀer and 0 if they don’t. In a similar spirit, it is
common in regression analysis to ﬁt a cloud of points indicating the values
taken by a "dependent" variable and a collection of "independent" ones
by a speciﬁc function whose parameters are "estimated" by minimizing the
sum of the (square of) the discrepancies between the predicted and observed
values of the dependent variables. The parametric curve estimated in this
fashion is commonly portrayed as "representative" of the cloud of points
In this paper, we show that the "preference of the majority" is represen-
tative in an analogous fashion of the individual preferences from which it
emanates in the sense that it minimizes the sum of distances between itself
and the preferences for some distance function that represents an underlying
notion of preference dissimilarity. What such a notion can be is, of course,
far from clear. Because of this, we take the prudent view of not specifying
too much what this notion can be. We actually identify the properties of
the preference dissimilarity notions that are necessary and suﬃcient for the
distance that numerically represent these notions to be minimized by a ma-
joritarian preference. The crucial property happens to be that of additivity
with respect to any two of three preferences that are connected by a highly
plausible notion of preference "compromise" underlying the Pareto princi-
ple. That is to say, a compromise between two preferences is any preference
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that agrees with the unanimity of the two preferences when this unanimity
is observed.
Our analysis can be seen as a generalization of a small literature in
social choice that has discussed the representativeness of the majoritarian
preference in the sense of distance minimization with respect to the speciﬁc
Kemeny notion of proximity (see e.g. Kemeny (1959) and Kemeny and Snell
(1962)). It has been known indeed for quite a while that, when transitive,
the majority relation maximizes the sum of pairwise agreements between
itself and the individual preferences (see e.g. Monjardet (2005)). In other
words, when the majority relation associated to a preference proﬁle is tran-
sitive, it is the unique Kemeny distance-minimizing social welfare relation
(Demange (2012)). This literature has also established that the majoritar-
ian preference can then be seen as the ‘median’ preference in a metric space
over preferences in which the metric is the Kemeny distance. For example,
Young and Levenglick (1978) have characterized in this fashion all Condorcet
consistent rules. The current paper therefore extends the results about the
"representativeness" of the majority by showing that it holds for a larger
class of notions of proximity than that of Kemeny that we precisely identify,
through the property of between-additivity. We also shows that the repre-
sentativeness of majoritarian preferences holds also in the (very frequent)
case where those majoritarian preferences are not transitive.
The approach adopted in this paper bears little connection with the liter-
ature on the "metric rationalizability" of collective rules developed by Camp-
bell and Nitzan (1986), Eckert and Klamler (2011), Elkind, Faliszewski, and
Slinko (2012), Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko (2015), Farkas and Nitzan
(1979), Hadjibeyli and Wilson (2019) and Lerer and Nitzan (1985) among
(possibly) others. The issue examined in this literature is that of selecting
a social state in a (ﬁnite) set as a function of the proﬁle of individual pref-
erences over this set. This literature is speciﬁcally concerned with ﬁnding
rules for making this selection in such a way that the chosen alternative is
that which would be unanimously preferred to any other in the proﬁle with
unanimously preferred social state that is the closest to the actual proﬁle.
This literature therefore assumes the existence of a distance function deﬁned
over pairs of preferences proﬁles. The current paper does not assume dis-
tance among proﬁles. Its basic ingredient are notions of dissimilarity between
preferences.
The plan of the remaining of the paper is as follows. In the next section,
we introduce the notation and the model. Section 2 states and prove the
results and section 3 concludes
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2 The Model
2.1 Notation
We are interested in problems involving variable collections of preferences
over a ﬁnite set X of at least 3 alternatives. Since preferences are described
as binary relations, we ﬁrst introduce our notation pertaining to those. By
a binary relation R on X, we mean a subset of X2. Given a binary re-
lation R on X, we deﬁne its symmetric factor RS by (x, y) ∈ RS ⇐⇒
{(x, y), (y, x)} ⊂ R and its asymmetric factor RA by (x, y) ∈ RA ⇐⇒
[(x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) /∈ R]. A binary relation R is asymmetric when it
coincides with its asymmetric factor. A binary relation R on X is:
(i) reﬂexive if (x, x) ∈ R for every x ∈ X.
(ii) linear if for no distinct x and y does the statement (x, y) ∈ RS hold.
(iii) transitive if, for any x, y and z ∈ X, (x, z) ∈ R always follows
(x, y) ∈ R and (y, z) ∈ R
(iv) complete if {(x, y), (y, x)} ∩R = ∅ for every distinct x, y ∈ X.
A reﬂexive and transitive binary relation is called an quasi-ordering, and
a complete quasi-ordering is called an ordering. We denote respectively by
C and R the set of all complete binary relations and orderings on X. For
any ordering R, we denote by X/R the quotient of X under R deﬁned
by: X/R = {A ⊂ X : {(a, a′), (a′, a)} ⊂ R for any a and a′ ∈ A and
{(a,a), (a, a)}  R for any a ∈ A, a ∈ X − A and }. Hence the set X/R
is the set of all classes of elements of X whose members are considered
pairwise equivalent by R. It is well-know (and easy to check) that X/R is
a partition of X if R is an ordering. Finally, for any two binary relations
R and R′, we denote by R △ R′ their symmetric set diﬀerence deﬁned by
R △ R′ = (R ∪R′)\(R ∩R′).
We start the analysis by discussing a bit the notion of a compromise
between preferences, that will always be depicted as complete and reﬂex-
ive binary relations. After all, most eﬀorts in social choice theory have
been toward ﬁnding a plausible notion of such compromise. The corner-
stone of the compromise’s idea is that of a (Pareto) respect for unanim-
ity. It seems indeed that any plausible notion of a compromise between
two diﬀerent preferences should respect the unanimity of those preferences
whenever it occurs. This idea underlies the following notion of intermedi-
ateness, or betweenness, between two preferences. For any binary relation
R ⊂ X × X, we denote by R its (possibly empty) non-trivial component
deﬁned by R = R ∩ [(X ×X)\{(x, y) ∈ X ×X : x = y}]. Hence, R is the
set of all pairs of distinct elements of X that are compared in one way or
another by R. In what follows, we will often ﬁnd useful to describe reﬂexive
binary relations R by their non-trivial component R.
Deﬁnition 1 For any two binary relations R and R′′ in C, we say that the
binary relation R′ is between R and R′′ if only if (R∩R′′) ⊆ R′ ⊆ (R∪R′′).
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In words, R′ is between R and R
′′
if R′ always agrees with the unanimity
of R and R′′ - when the latter occurs - and, somewhat conversely, never
expresses a preference for one alternative over the other if this preference is
not also expressed by either R or R′′. We observe trivially that this notion
of betweenness is symmetric: R′ is indeed between R and R′′ if and only if it
is between R′′ and R. The deﬁnition of betweenness applies therefore to any
three binary relations and generates as such a ternary relation onX. It turns
out that an alternative - but actually equivalent - deﬁnition of betweenness
can be formulated for complete binary relations. This equivalent deﬁnition
makes, in our view, the notion of betweenness underlying Deﬁnition 1 even
more intuitive.
Lemma 1 Let R, R′ and R′′ be three complete binary relations on X. Then
R′ is between R and R′′ as per Deﬁnition 1 if only if it satisﬁes:
(i) (x, y) ∈ R and (x, y) ∈ R′′ =⇒ (x, y) ∈ R′ and,
(ii) (x, y) ∈ RA and (x, y) ∈ R′′A =⇒ (x, y) ∈ R′A
Proof. For one direction of the implication (that does not actually require
completeness), let R, R′ and R′′ be three complete binary relations on X
such that R′ is between R and R′′ as per Deﬁnition 1. Since (R∩R′′) ⊆ R′ ,
Condition (i) of the Lemma follows. Assume now that x and y are two
alternatives such that (x, y) ∈ RA and (x, y) ∈ R′′A. From the deﬁnition of
the asymmetric factor of a binary relation, one has (x, y) ∈ R and (x, y) ∈
R′′ and, since (R∩R′′) ⊆ R′, one must have (x, y) ∈ R′. We now show that
(y, x) /∈ R′. Suppose to the contrary that (y, x) ∈ R′. Since R′ ⊆ (R∪R′′), one
must have either (y, x) ∈ R or (y, x) ∈ R′′. But neither of these statements
is consistent with the fact that both (x, y) ∈ RA and (x, y) ∈ R′′A hold.
For the other direction of the implication, assume that R, R′ and R′′ are
three complete binary relations on X for which Statements (i) and (ii) of
the lemma holds. Statement (i) clearly implies that (R∩R′′) ⊆ R′. Consider
now any two alternatives x and y in X such that neither (x, y) ∈ R nor
(x, y) ∈ R′′ is true. We wish to show that (x, y) ∈ R′ does not hold. To
see this, we observe that, since R and R′′are complete, the fact that neither
(x, y) ∈ R nor (x, y) ∈ R′′ is true implies that (y, x) ∈ RA and (y, x) ∈
R′′A. By Statement (ii) of the lemma, this implies that (y, x) ∈ R′A, which
implies in turn, from the very deﬁnition of the asymmetric factor of a binary
relation, that (x, y) /∈ R′, as required.
Lemma 1 thus provides additional intuition about what it means for a
preference to be "between" two others. A preference is between two others
if and only if it results from a (Paretian) compromise between those pref-
erences. For any two preferences R and R′′, we let B(R,R′′) = {R′ ∈R:
|R′ is between R and R′′}. Since, for any two preferences R and R′′, both R
and R′′ are (trivially) between R and R′′, the set B(R,R′′) is never empty.
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Indeed, the notion of betweenness introduced by Deﬁnition 1 is a weak one
that does not rule out the possibility that some (or all) of the three pref-
erences R, R′ and R′′ involved in the deﬁnition be the same. This suggests
the possibility of introducing the additional notion of strict betweenness as
follows.
Deﬁnition 2 For any two distinct binary relations R and R′′ in R, we say
that R′ is strictly between R and R′′ if only if one has (R ∩ R′′) ⊆ R′ ⊆
(R ∪R′′), R′ = R and R′′ = R′ .
For any two distinct relation R and R′′ in C, we let B(R,R′′) = {R′ ∈R:
|R′ is strictly between R and R′′}. The notion of strict betweenness just
introduced opens the possibility for two distinct binary relations R and R′′
in C to have no preference that lie strictly between them (and thus to have
B(R,R′) = ∅). For example, if X = {a, b, c}, the distinct orderings R and
R′′ deﬁned by:
R = {(a, b), (b, c), (a, c)} and,
R′′ = {(a, b), (b, a), (b, c), (a, c)}
have no ordering that lie strictly between them.
Any two distinct binary relations that have no preference that lie strictly
between them will be called "adjacent". We formally deﬁne this notion of
adjacency between binary relations as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 Two distinct binary relations R and R′′ in C are said to be
adjacent if they are such that B(R,R′) = ∅.
The following lemma establishes an alternative deﬁnition of adjacency
between two distinct preferences.
Lemma 2 Two distinct binary relations R and R′′ in C are adjacent as per
Deﬁnition 3 if and only if they are such that #(R △ R′′) = 1.
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that R and R′′ are two distinct binary relations such
that #(R △ R′′) = 1. Since R and R′′ are distinct, there exists a pair of
alternatives (x, y) ∈ X ×X such that either (i) (x, y) ∈ R and (x, y) /∈ R′′
or (ii) (x, y) ∈ R′′ and (x, y) /∈ R. The two cases being symmetric, we only
consider the ﬁrst of them. Since #(R △ R′′) = 1, one must have (x′, y′) ∈
R ∩ R′′ for all (x′, y′) ∈ R ∪ R′′ such that (x′, y′) = (x, y). In order for a
binary relation R′ to be between R and R′′ as per Deﬁnition 1, one must thus
have (x′, y′) ∈ R′ for all (x′, y′) ∈ R ∪R′′ such that (x′, y′) = (x, y). If now
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(x, y) ∈ R′, then R′ = R. If on the other hand (x, y) /∈ R′, then R′ = R′′.
Hence, one cannot have both R′ = R and R′ = R′′. To prove the other
direction of the implication, suppose that #(R △ R′′) > 1. This means that
there are at least two distinct pairs of alternatives (x, y) and (x′, y′) ∈ X×X
such that {(x, y), (x′, y′)} ⊂ R∪R′′ and {(x, y), (x′, y′)}∩ (R∩R′′) = ∅. We
consider several cases.
(i) {(x, y), (x′, y′)} ⊂ R\R′′.
(ii) {(x, y), (x′, y′)} ⊂ R′′\R.
(iii) (x, y) ∈ R\R′′ and (x′, y′) ∈ R′′\R
(iv) (x, y) ∈ R′′\R and (x′, y′) ∈ R\R′′
’If case (i) holds, then the binary relation R′ = R′′∪{(x, y)} is distinct from
both R and R′′ and is between them as per Deﬁnition 1. Similarly, if case (ii)
holds, the binary relation R′ = R∪{(x, y)} would be distinct from both R and
R′′ and between them as per Deﬁnition 1. In Case (iii), the binary relation
R′ = R′′∪{(x, y)} would be distinct from R′′ (by containing (x, y)) and from
R (by containing (x′, y′)), while being clearly between both R and R′′ as per
Deﬁnition 1. Similarly for case (iv), the binary relation R′ = R ∪ {(x, y)}
would be distinct from R (by containing (x, y)) and from R′′ (by containing
(x′, y′)), while being again between both R and R′′as per Deﬁnition 1. This
completes the proof.
The test provided by Lemma 2 for checking whether or not two binary
relations are adjacent is simple enough. Two binary relations are adjacent if
and only if they diﬀer from each other by exactly one ordered pair.
We now introduce the notion of a majoritarian preference relation asso-
ciated to a given proﬁle of such preferences. Our deﬁnition of such a notion
is as follows.
Deﬁnition 4 Given a proﬁle of n complete and reﬂexive preference rela-
tions (R1, ..., Rn) on X for some integer n ≥ 2, we say that the complete
and reﬂexive binary relation R on X is majoritarian for (R1, ..., Rn) if it
satisﬁes, for every x and y ∈ X, #{i : (x, y) ∈ Ri} > n/2 =⇒ (x, y) ∈ R
and #{i : (x, y) ∈ RAi} > n/2 =⇒ (x, y) ∈ RA
We observe that a proﬁle of preferences (R1, ..., Rn) will typically have
many such majoritarian preferences. One of them is the classical majority
rule deﬁned, for every proﬁle of preferences (R1, ..., Rn), by (x, y) ∈ R ⇐⇒
#{i : (x, y) ∈ Ri} ≥ n/2. Another is the Kemeny-Young rule characterized
by Young and Levenglick (1978). We record for further reference the follow-
ing obvious remark concerning the deﬁnition of a Majoritarian preference.
Remark 1 A complete and reﬂexive preference R ∈ C is Majoritarian with
respect to the proﬁle (R1, ..., Rn) (for some integer n ≥ 2) if and only if it
satisﬁes, for every x and y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ R =⇒ #{i : (x, y) ∈ Ri} ≥ n/2
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and (x, y) /∈ R =⇒ #{i : (x, y) ∈ Ri} ≤ n/2.
Proof. In one direction, assume that R ∈ C is Majoritarian in the sense of
Deﬁnition 4 for the proﬁle (R1, ..., Rn) ∈ Cn and let x and y be alternatives
in X such that (x, y) ∈ R. Suppose by contradiction that #{i : (x, y) ∈
Ri} < n/2. Since the preferences (R1, ..., Rn) are complete, this means that
#{i : (y, x) ∈ RAi} = n−#{i : (x, y) ∈ Ri} > n/2. But if R is Majoritarian
with respect to (R1, ..., Rn) as per deﬁnition 4, one must have (y, x) ∈ RA,
which is a contradiction. Similarly, assuming again that R is a complete
and reﬂexive binary relation that is Majoritarian in the sense of Deﬁnition
4 with respect to the proﬁle of preferences (R1, ..., Rn) ∈ Cn, suppose there
are some x and y ∈ X for which one has (x, y) /∈ R. Since R is complete, one
must have (y, x) ∈ RA. But then, assuming that #{i : (x, y) ∈ Ri} > n/2
would contradict the ﬁrst requirement of Deﬁnition 4 that R is majoritarian.
Hence #{i : (x, y) ∈ Ri} ≤ n/2 must hold. The proof for the other direction
is immediate.
The main contribution of the paper is to characterize any majoritarian
preference over some proﬁle as a minimizer of the sum of the pairwise dis-
tances between itself and the preferences of the proﬁle for some distance
function that numerically represents a notion of pairwise dissimilarity be-
tween preferences. As it turns out, the distance-minimizing property of a
majoritarian preference depends crucially upon a property of the distance
that we refer to as "between-additivity". We introduce as follows this prop-
erty along with a formal deﬁnition of a distance function on C × C.
Deﬁnition 5 (Distance) A function d : C×C → R+ is a distance func-
tion if it satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) Identity at equality only: d(R1, R2) = 0 if and only if R1 = R2.
(ii) Symmetry: d(R1, R2) = d(R2, R1) for all R1, R2 ∈ C.
(iii) Triangle Inequality: d(R1, R3) ≤ d(R1, R2) + d(R2, R3)
Moreover, a function d : C × C → R+ is called a between-additive dis-
tance function if it satisﬁes, in addition to (i)-(iii):
(iv) d(R1, R3) = d(R1, R2) + d(R2, R3) for every R1, R2 and R3 ∈ C such
that R2 ∈ B(R1, R3)
The crucial property of a distance insofar as representativeness of the
majority relation goes is property (iv). This property requires the dis-
tance to be "additive" with respect to any combination of two preferences
taken from three preferences that are connected by a betweenness relation.
This property has been used as an axiom in the characterization of the
Kemeny distance over orderings (see e.g. Kemeny (1959) and Kemeny and
Snell (1962) and the example below) recently made by Can and Storcken
(2018), and used in the context of rank mobility measurement by Bossert,
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Can, and D’Ambrosio (2016). This property, when imposed on a function
d : C ×C → R+ satisfying (i) and (ii) is quite strong since it implies, among
other things, that the function d satisﬁes the Triangle inequality. Hence,
while this Triangle property (iii) is commonly considered as a key property
of any distance, it is redundant when applied to a between-linear distance
function. We state and prove this fact formally in the following Lemma (see
also Lemma 1 in Bossert, Can, and D’Ambrosio (2016)).1
Lemma 3 Let d : C × C → R+ be a function satisfying identity at equality
only, symmetry and property (iv) of Deﬁnition 5 above. Then d satisﬁes
Triangle inequality and is therefore a between-additive distance function.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that d : C ×C → R+ is a function satisfy-
ing identity at equality only, symmetry and between-additivity (property (iv)
of Deﬁnition 5) that does not satisfy Triangle inequality. This means that
there are preferences R1, R2 and R3 ∈ C such that:
d(R1, R3) > d(R1, R2) + d(R2, R3) (1)
It is clear from this inequality and property (iv) that R2 /∈ B(R1, R3). We
now establish that Inequality (1) applied to a non-negatively valued function
d satisfying (i), (ii) and (iv) of Deﬁnition 5 rules out also the possibility
that R1 ∈ B(R2, R3) or that R3 ∈ B(R1, R2). Assume indeed that R1 ∈
B(R2, R3). By between-additivity, this entails that:
d(R2, R3) = d(R2, R1) + d(R1, R3)
and, after substituting into the right hand side of Inequality (1):
d(R1, R3) > d(R1, R2) + d(R2, R1) + d(R1, R3)
= 2d(R1, R2) + d(R1, R3) (by symmetry)
⇐⇒
0 > 2d(R1, R2)
a contradiction of d(R1, R2) ∈ R+. Hence R1 /∈ B(R2, R3). An analogous
argument leads to the conclusion that R3 /∈ B(R1, R2).
Consider then the preference R2 deﬁned by:
R2 = (R2 ∪ (R1 ∩R3))\(R2\(R1 ∪R3)).
1Bossert, Can, and D’Ambrosio (2016) present their unproved Lemma 1 as "an imme-
diate consequence of Theorem 3 of Can and Storcken (2015)". Yet, to the very best of our
understanding, Theorem 3 in Can and Storcken (2015) deals with distance or dissimilarity
functions deﬁned over orderings. Our approach here apply to any complete binary relation.
We therefore ﬁnds useful to provide a proof of the result for this general case as well.
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R2 is distinct from R2 if R2 /∈ B(R1, R3). By construction, R2 ∈ B(R1, R3).
Let us show that R2 ∈ B(R1, R2). Consider any (x, y) ∈ R1 ∩ R2. Since
none of the three preference is between the two others, there must be at
least one such pair (x, y) ∈ R1 ∩ R2. In eﬀect, if there were none, then
any complete preference would be between R1 and R2, including R3. Clearly,
R1∩R2 ⊂ R2 ⊂ (R2∪(R1∩R3)). Moreover (R1∩R2)∩(R2\(R1∪R3)) = ∅.
Hence R1∩R2 ⊂ R2 = (R2∪(R1∩R3))\(R2\(R1∪R3)). For the other part of
the deﬁnition of Betweenness, we simply observe that R2 ⊂ (R2∪(R1∩R3)) ⊂
R2 ∪R1. Using a similar argument, we can also show that R2 ∈ B(R2, R3).
Using between-additivity, we can write Inequality (1) as:
d(R1, R2) + d( R2, R3) > d(R1, R2) + d( R2, R2) + d(R2, R2) + d( R2, R3)
⇐⇒
0 > 2d( R2, R2) (using symmetry)
which is a contradiction of the non-negativity of d.
Another clear implication of "between-additivity" is consistency with
respect to the betweenness relation. Any preference that is between two
others will always be more similar to any of these two preferences than the
two preferences themselves. We state formally this as follows.
Remark 2 Let d : C×C → R+ be a between-additive distance function
Then, for any three distinct R, R′ and R′′ ∈ C such that R′ ∈ B(R,R′′), one
has:
d(R,R′) < d(R,R′′) and d(R′, R′′) < d(R,R′′)
Proof. Since d satisﬁes Triangle inequality, one has:
d(R,R′′) ≤ d(R,R′) + d(R′, R′′)
The conclusion then follows at once from the fact that d satisﬁes non-
negativity and identity at equality, and the assumption that R, R′ and R′′
are all distinct.
We now provide two well-know examples of distances between prefer-
ences, the ﬁrst of which satisfying between-additivity, and the other not.
Example 1 The Kemeny notion of dissimilarity. This distance function,
denoted dK , is deﬁned as follows:
dK(R1, R2) ≥ dK(R3, R4)⇐⇒ #(R1 △ R2) ≥ #(R3 △ R4)
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This distance function deﬁnes the dissimilarity between any two preferences
by the number of pairs of alternatives on ranking of which the two preferences
disagree. This distance is obviously between-linear and, as recalled above,
between-linearity is often used as an axiom to characterize, along with other
axioms, this distance (see e.g. Kemeny (1959), Kemeny and Snell (1962),
Can and Storcken (2018), and Bossert, Can, and D’Ambrosio (2016)).
Example 2 The Spearman (1904) notion of dissimilarity (see Monjardet
(1998) for a comparison of the Kemeny and the Spearman notions of simi-
larity among linear orderings). This distance function dS, which only applies
to orderings, is deﬁned by:
dS(R1, R2) ≥ d(R3, R4)⇐⇒ [

x∈X
(r1(x)−r2(x))2]1/2 ≥ [

x∈X
(r3(x)−r4(x))2]1/2
where, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, ri(x) denoted the rank of alternative x in the ordering
Ri deﬁned by:
ri(x) = 1 +#{A ∈ X/Ri : (a, x) ∈ RAi for a ∈ A}
It is readily seen that the Spearman distance is a distance function from
C × C to the real but is not between-additive .For example if we take X =
{a, b, c} and R1∩ = {(a, b), (b, c), (a, c)}, R2 = {(b, c), (b, a), (a, c)} R3 =
{(c, b), (b, a), (c, a)}, it is clear that R2 ∈ B(R1, R3). However:
dS(R1, R3) = [(3− 1)2 + (2− 2)2 + (1− 3)2]1/2 = 2
√
2
< dS(R1, R2) + d(R2, R3)
= [(3− 2)2 + (3− 2)2]1/2 + [(2− 1)2 + (3− 2)2 + (3− 1)2]1/2
= (1 +
√
3)
√
2
We now turn to the two main results of this paper. The ﬁrst one states
that a preference minimizes the sum of distances between itself and a collec-
tion of preferences for some between-additive distance function if and only
if this preference is majoritarian with respect to the considered collection of
preference. We state formally this result as follows.
Theorem 1 Let d be a between-additive distance function and, for some in-
teger n, let (R1, ..., Rn) ∈

n∈N
Cn be a proﬁle of complete preference relations.
Then the complete preference R∗ ∈ C satisﬁes the inequality:
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
∗) ≤
n
i=1
d(Ri, R)) ∀R ∈ C. (2)
if and only if R∗ is majoritarian for (R1, ..., Rn).
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Proof.
Suﬃciency. Suppose that R∗ and d are, respectively, a Majoritarian prefer-
ence relation for a proﬁle (R1, ..., Rn) for some integer n ≥ 2 and a between-
additive distance function. Consider any proﬁle of preferences (R1, ..., Rn) ∈
D (for some n ∈ N) and any R ∈ C. We need to show thatni=1 d(Ri, R∗) ≤n
i=1 d(Ri, R). Proving this is immediate if R = R
∗. Hence, we assume
that R = R∗. Our proof strategy is to construct a sequence of preferences
(R0, R1, . . . , Rq) in such way that R0 = R, Rq = R∗and the following holds:
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
j+1) ≤
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
j) ∀ j ∈ {0, q − 1}.
We construct the sequence as follows, starting with R0 = R, and exploiting
the fact that R = R∗.
(a) Rj\{xj, yj} = Rj−1\{xj , yj) and Rj = Rj−1 ∪ {(xj, yj)} for some
(xj , yj) ∈ X × X such that (xj, yj) ∈ R∗ and (xj, yj) /∈ Rj−1 if there are
such (xj, yj) and by:
(b) Rj\{xj , yj} = R0\{xj , yj) and Rj = Rj−1\{(xj, yj)} if there are no
pair (x, y) ∈ X ×X satisfying the condition mentioned in (a) but there are
(xj , yj) ∈ Rj−1 such that (xj, yj) /∈ R∗.
Observe that this sequence is not, in general, unique. Indeed, at any step
t = 1, ..., q, there can be typically many pairs either of the type mentioned
in (a) or of the type mentioned in (b). But any sequence constructed in this
way will do. Observe also, thanks to the alternative deﬁnition of a Majori-
tarian decision function provided by Remark 1, that the terminal step q of
the sequence is reached when there are no pair (xq, yq) ∈ X ×X such that
(xq, yq) ∈ R∗ and (xq, yq) /∈ Rq−1 and there are also no pair (xq, yq) ∈ Rq−1
such that (xq, yq) /∈ R∗. This terminal step obviously corresponds to the
situation where Rq = R∗. We now show that:
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
j) ≤
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
j−1) (3)
for all j = 1, ..., q. A preliminary step for this is the observation that if
two distinct preferences R and R′′ are adjacent, then for any preference
R′ distinct from both R and R′′, one must have either R ∈ B(R′, R′′) or
R′′ ∈ B(R,R′). To see this, we ﬁrst recall that by Lemma 2, R and R′′ are
adjacent if and only if they diﬀer only by one pair (say (x, y)). Suppose
without loss of generality (up to a permutation of the role of R and R′′ in
the argument) that (x, y) ∈ R and (x, y) /∈ R′′. Consider then any preference
R′ distinct from both R and R′′. If (x, y) ∈ R′, then one has that R′ ∩R′′ ⊂
R ⊂ R′ ∪ R′′ so that R ∈ B(R′, R′′). If on the other hand (x, y) /∈ R′, then
one has R∩R′ ⊂ R′′ ⊂ R∪R′ and, therefore, R′′ ∈ B(R,R′). We now prove
Inequality (3). It is clear by the deﬁnition of the sequence given above that
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Rj and Rj+1 are adjacent. They either diﬀer by a pair (xj, yj) such that
(xj , yj) ∈ R∗ and (xj, yj) /∈ Rj−1 (Case (a)) or by a pair (xj, yj) ∈ Rj−1
such that (xj, yj) /∈ R∗ (Case (b)). If we are in Case (a), then (xj, yj) ∈
R∗ which implies, by deﬁnition of R∗ being Majoritarian (Remark 1), that
#{i : (xj, yj) ∈ Ri} ≥ n/2. The observation made above about the adjacent
preferences Rj−1 and Rj and any other preference, including one observed
in the proﬁle (R1, ..., Rn) applies. In particular, for any individual i such
that xj Ri y
j, one has that Ri∩Rj−1 ⊂ Rj ⊂ Ri∪Rj−1. Hence for any such
i, Rj ∈ B(Ri, Rj−1). We therefore have, using between-additivity of d:
d(Ri, R
j−1) = d(Ri, R
j) + d(Rj−1, Rj) (4)
Analogously, for all other h (if any) such that (xj , yj) /∈ Rh, we have that
Rh ∩ Rj ⊂ Rj−1 ⊂ Rh ∪ Rj and, therefore, that Rj−1 ∈ B(Rh, Rj). Using
again between-additivity of d, we can write:
d(Rh, R
j) = d(Rh, R
j−1) + d(Rj−1, Rj)
or:
d(Rh, R
j−1) = d(Rh, R
j)− d(Rj−1, Rj) (5)
Summing Equalities (4) and (5) over all concerned individuals and rearrang-
ing yields:

i:(xj ,yj)∈Ri
d(Ri, R
j−1) +

h:(yj ,xj)∈RAh
d(Rh, R
j−1) =

i:(xj ,yj)∈Ri
d(Ri, R
j)
+

h:(yj ,xj)∈RAh
d(Rh, R
j) + [#{i : (xj, yj) ∈ Ri} −#{h : (yj , xj) ∈ RAh }]d(Rj−1, Rj)]
≥

i:(xj ,yj)∈Ri
d(Ri, R
j) +

h:yjRAiyj
d(Rh, R
j)
because d(Rj−1, Rj) > 0 and #{i : (xj , yj) ∈ Ri} ≥ #{h : (yj , xj)RAh xj}.
If we are in Case (b), then there is a pair (xj , yj) ∈ Rj−1 such that (xj , yj) /∈
R∗ and Rj = Rj−1\{(xj, yj)}. Since (xj, yj) /∈ R∗ and R∗ is complete, one
has that yj R∗ xj. Since R∗is majoritarian relative to (R1, ..., Rn), we must
have - thanks to Remark 1 - that #{i : (xj, yj) ∈ Ri} < n/2. Applying
again the above reasoning on the adjacent pairs Rj and Rj−1, we have that
Rh ∩Rj−1 ⊂ Rj ⊂ Rh ∪Rj−1 for any individual h such that (xj, yj) /∈ Rh.
Hence one has Rj ∈ B(Rh, Rj−1) for any such individual so that one can
write, using the additivity of d:
d(Rh, R
j−1) = d(Rh, R
j) + d(Rj−1, Rj) (6)
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Similarly, for any individual i such that (xj, yj) ∈ Ri, we have Ri ∩ Rj ⊂
Rj−1 ⊂ Ri ∪Rj and, therefore, Rj−1 ∈ B(Ri, Rj) so that one can write for
any such individual (again using the additivity of d):
d(Ri, R
j) = d(Ri, R
j−1) + d(Rj−1, Rj)
or:
d(Ri, R
j−1) = d(Ri, R
j)− d(Rj−1, Rj) (7)
Summing Equalities (6) and (7) over all the relevant individuals and rear-
ranging yields:

h:(yj ,xj)∈RAh
d(Rh, R
j−1) +

i:(xj ,yj)∈Ri
d(Ri, R
j−1) =

h:(yj ,xj)∈RAh
d(Rh, R
j)
+

i:(xj ,yj)∈Ri
d(Ri, R
j) + [#{h : (yj , xj) ∈ RAh} −#{i : (xj , yj) ∈ Ri}]d(Rj−1, Rj)
≥

h:(yj ,xj)∈RAh
d(Rh, R
j) +

i:(xj ,yj)∈Ri
d(Ri, R
j)
because d(Rj−1, Rj) > 0 and #{h : (yj, xj) ∈ RAh} ≥ #{i : (xj , yj) ∈ Ri}.
This completes the proof that Inequality (4) holds for every j = 1, ..., q. The
suﬃciency part of the theorem is then proved by the transitive repetition of
this inequality.
Necessity. Let R∗ be a preference in C that is not majoritarian for a proﬁle
of complete preferences (R1, R2, ..., Rn). This means that there are alter-
natives x and y ∈ X for which either (i) #{i : (x, y) ∈ Ri} > n/2 and
(x, y) /∈ R∗ or (ii) #{i : (x, y) ∈ RAi} > n/2 and (x, y) /∈ R∗A. Suppose
ﬁrst that case (i) holds. Consider then any between-additive distance func-
tion d : C × C → R+. We wish to show that there exists a preference R′ ∈ C
such that:
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
′) <
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
∗).
For this sake, we simply deﬁne R′ by R′ = R∗ ∪ {(x, y)}. We ﬁrst prove
that, for any i ∈ {1, ..., n} such that (x, y) ∈ Ri, one has R′ ∈ B(Ri, R∗).
Indeed, consider any (a, b) ∈ Ri ∩R∗. We know that (a, b) = (x, y) (because
by assumption (x, y) /∈ R∗). Since any other pair (a, b) ∈ Ri∩R∗ also belongs
to R∗, it belongs to R∗ ∪ {(x, y)} = R′. Consider now any pair (a, b) ∈ R′.
Either (a, b) = (x, y) in which case (x, y) ∈ Ri or (a, b) = (x, y) in which
case (a, b) ∈ R∗ = R′\{(x, y)}. Hence R′ ⊂ Ri ∪R∗. We now show that for
any h ∈ {1, ..., n} such that (x, y) /∈ Rh, one has R∗ ∈ B(Rh, R′). Indeed,
consider any (a, b) ∈ Rh∩R′. Since (x, y) /∈ Rh, we know that (a, b) = (x, y).
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Hence (a, b) ∈ R′\{x, y} = R∗. Moreover, it is clear that R∗ ⊂ R′ ⊂ R′∪Rh.
Now, exploiting the between-additivity of d, one has:
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
′) =

i:(x,y)∈Ri
d(Ri, R
′) +

h:(x,y)/∈Rh
[d(Rh, R
∗) + d(R∗, R′)] (8)
and:
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
∗) =

h:(x,y)/∈Rh
d(Rh, R
∗) +

i:(x,y)∈Ri
[d(Ri, R
′) + d(R′, R∗)] (9)
Subtracting (8) from (9) yields (after cancelling common terms):
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
′)−
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
∗) = [#{i : (x, y) ∈ Ri} −#{h : (x, y) /∈ Rh}]d(R′, R∗)
> 0
because #{i : (x, y) ∈ Ri} > n/2 ≥ #{h : (x, y) /∈ Rh} and d(R′, R∗) > 0.
The argument for case (ii) is of similar nature and the details are left to the
reader.
This theorem thus characterizes a preference that is majoritarian with
respect to a proﬁle of preferences as being "representative" of those pref-
erences in the sense of minimizing the sum of distances itself and the pref-
erences of the proﬁle for any between-additive numerical distance-function
deﬁned over preferences. The next theorem characterizes, somewhat dually,
the property of between-additivity of a distance as being essential for the
ability of majoritarian preference to be representative in this sense of aggre-
gate distance minimization. Speciﬁcally, we now prove that if a majoritarian
preference for a given preference proﬁle is to be distance-minimizing with
respect to this proﬁle for some distance function, then the distance function
must be between-additive.
Theorem 2 Suppose d : C × C → R+ is a distance function such that, for
every proﬁle (R1, ..., Rn) ∈ Cn for some n ≥ 2, a majoritarian preference R∗
for this proﬁle satisﬁes the inequality:
n
i=1
d(Ri, R
∗) ≤
n
i=1
d(Ri, R) ∀R ∈ C. (10)
Then d is between-additive.
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Proof. Suppose that a distance d : C × C → R+ is not between-additive.
This means that there are complete binary relations R1, R2 and R3 on X
such that R2 ∈ B(R1, R3) and
d(R1, R3) < d(R1, R2) + d(R2, R3) (11)
using the Triangle inequality. Consider then the proﬁle of preferences (R1, R3).
We ﬁrst establish that R2 is Majoritarian on the proﬁle (R1, R3). To see this,
we use Remark 1, and we ﬁrst consider any x and y such that (x, y) ∈ R2.
Since R2 ∈ B(R1, R3), one must have (x, y) ∈ R1 ∪R3. Hence, at least one
of the two preferences (R1, R3) in the proﬁle must contain the pair (x, y).
Hence #{i : (x, y) ∈ Ri} ≥ 1 = n2 . Consider now x and y such that (x, y) /∈
R2. Since R2 ∈ B(R1, R3) and, as a result, R1 ∩ R3 ⊂ R2, one must have
that (x, y) /∈ R1 ∩ R3. Hence there can be at most one of the two prefer-
ences R1 and R3 that contain the pair (x, y). Put diﬀerently #{i : (x, y) ∈
Ri} ≤ 1 = n2 , as required by the second condition of Remark 1. Hence R2
is Majoritarian on the proﬁle (R1, R3). However, R2 does not minimize the
sum of distance between itself and the two individual preferences of the proﬁle
because, from Inequality 11 and the property of identity of the indiscernible,
one has (using symmetry):
d(R1, R1)+d(R1, R3) = d(R1, R3) < d(R1, R2)+d(R2, R3) = d(R2, R1)+d(R2, R3).
Hence R1 (but the argument would work just as well for R3) has a strictly
smaller aggregate distance from the individual preferences of the proﬁle (R1, R3)
than R2. This completes the proof.
Remark 3 The necessity of the between-additivity of the distance that is
minimized by a majoritarian preference rides upon the triangle inequality of
that distance.
As shown in Example 2 above, there are many plausible notions of
distances between preferences that are not between-additive. On the other
hand, the Kemeny distance is a well-known example of between-additive
distance. One may wonder whether there are other notions of distance than
Kemeny that are between-additive. The following example shows that there
are quite a few. Hence, the results of this paper are signiﬁcant generalizations
of the fact that a Majoritarian preference minimizes the sum of the Kemeny
distance between itself and the list of preferences from which it emanates.
Example 3 Consider any function δ : X×X → [0, 1] be such that δ(x, x′) =
δ(x′, x) for all x, x′ ∈ X. Functions like this clearly exist. For example, taking
any linear ordering R of X, one can deﬁne δR by:
δR(x, x′) =
| rR(x)− rR(x′) |
#X
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where rR(x) is the rank of x under R deﬁned (in the case of a linear ordering)
by:
rR(x) = 1 +#{y ∈ X : (y, x) ∈ RA}
δR so deﬁned obviously maps X × X into [0, 1] and satisﬁes δ(x, x′) =
δ(x′, x) for all x, x′ ∈ X. For any such function δ therefore, deﬁne a function
dδ : C× C → R+ as follows:
dδ(R1, R2) =

{(x,x′)∈R1 R2:x=x′}
δ(x, x′).
It is easily veriﬁed that dδ so deﬁned satisﬁes the three ﬁrst Properties
of Deﬁnition 5.
• Non-negativity: This holds by deﬁnition of δ.
• Identity only at equality: For any R1 = R2 we have (R1\R2) =
(R2\R1) = φ. Therefore, dα(R1, R1) = 0.
• Symmetry: Since (R1\R2) ∪ (R2\R1) = (R1\R2) ∪ (R2\R1) for all
R1, R2 ∈ C, we have dα(R1, R2) = dα(R2, R1).
We now show that dδ satisﬁes between-additivity. That is, for any R1, R2, R3
such that R2 ∈ B(R1, R3), we show that dδ(R1, R2)+dδ(R2, R3) = dδ(R1, R3).
From the deﬁnition of dδ, one can write:
dδ(R1, R2)+d
δ(R2, R3) =

(x,x′)∈R1△R2:x=x′
δ(x, x′)+

(y,y′)∈R1△R2:y =y′
δ(y, y′)
Since (R\R′) ∪ (R′\R) = (R ∪ R′)\(R ∩ R′) for all complete binary
relations R and R′, one can also write:
dδ(R1, R2)+d
δ(R2, R3) =

(x,x′)∈R1△R2:x=x′
δ(x, x′)+

(y,y′)∈R1△R2:y =y′
δ(y, y′)
(12)
We now observe that the sets (R1 ∪R2)\(R1 ∩R2) and (R2 ∪R3)\(R2 ∩
R3) are disjoint. Indeed, suppose that (x, x′) ∈ (R1 ∪R2)\(R1 ∩R2). Then,
either (i) (x, x′) ∈ R1\R2 or (ii) (x, x′) ∈ R2\R1. In case (i), we know
that (x, x′) /∈ R3\R2 (by deﬁnition of R2 ∈ B(R1, R3)). Since by assumption
(x, x′) /∈ R2, one has (x, x′) /∈ R2\R3. Hence (x, x′) /∈ R2\R3 ∪ R3\R2 =
(R2∪R3)\(R2∩R3). In case (ii), we know by deﬁnition that (x, x′) /∈ R3/R2
(because (x, x′) ∈ R2). Since R2 ∈ B(R1, R3), one can not have (x, x′) ∈
R2\R3 (because R2 ⊂ R1∪R3). Hence any pair in the set (R1∪R2)\(R1∩R2)
is not in the set (R2 ∪R3)\(R2 ∩R3) so that the two sets are disjoint. We
now show that:
[(R1 ∪R2)\(R1 ∩R2)] ∪ [(R2 ∪R3)\(R2 ∩R3)] = (R1 ∪R3)\(R1 ∩R3)
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We ﬁrst prove that [(R1 ∪R2)\(R1 ∩R2)] ∪ [(R2 ∪R3)\(R2 ∩R3)] ⊂ (R1 ∪
R3)\(R1 ∩ R3). Consider for this sake any pair of alternatives (x, x′) ∈
[(R1∪R2)\(R1∩R2)]∪ [(R2∪R3)\(R2∩R3)]. Four (non-mutually exclusive)
cases are compatible with this consideration:
(i) (x, x′) ∈ R1\R2
(ii) (x, x′) ∈ R2\R1
(iii) (x, x′) ∈ R2\R3
(iv) (x, x′) ∈ R3\R2
Consider Case (i). Since R2 ∈ B(R1, R3), one can not have (x, x′) ∈ R3
(because in this case, one would have (x, x′) ∈ R1∩R3 ⊂ R2, in contradiction
of (x, x′) ∈ R1\R2). Hence (x, x′) ∈ R1\R3 ⊂ (R1 ∪R3)\(R1 ∩R3). Suppose
now that we are in Case (ii). By assumption (x, x′) /∈ R1 and (x, x′) ∈
R2 ⊂ R1 ∪ R3 (since R2 ∈ B(R1, R3)). Hence (x, x′) ∈ R3\R1 ⊂ (R1 ∪
R3)\(R1 ∩R3). For Cases (iii) and (iv), we just apply the argument of case
(ii) and (i) (respectively) up to permuting R1 and R3. We now prove that
(R1 ∪R3)\(R1 ∩R3) ⊂ [(R1 ∪R2)\(R1 ∩R2)] ∪ [(R2 ∪R3)\(R2 ∩R3)]. Let
(x, x′) ∈ (R1∪R3)\(R1∩R3). This means either that (x, x′) ∈ R1\R3 or that
(x, x′) ∈ R3\R1. In the ﬁrst case either (x, x′) ∈ R2 (in which case (x, x′) ∈
R2\R3 ⊂ [(R1 ∪R2)\(R1 ∩R2)]∪ [(R2 ∪R3)\(R2 ∩R3)]) or (x, x′) /∈ R2 (in
which case (x, x′) ∈ R1\R2 ⊂ [(R1∪R2)\(R1∩R2)]∪ [(R2∪R3)\(R2∩R3)]).
The argument for the other case is similar. Since the sets (R1∪R2)\(R1∩R2)
and (R2 ∪R3)\(R2 ∩R3) are disjoint and are such that
[(R1 ∪R2)\(R1 ∩R2)] ∪ [(R2 ∪R3)\(R2 ∩R3)] = (R1 ∪R3)\(R1 ∩R3)
one can write Equality (12) as:
dδ(R1, R2) + d
δ(R2, R3) =

(x,x′)∈R1△R2:x=x′
δ(x, x′) +

(y,y′)∈R1△R2:y =y′
δ(y, y′)
=

(x,x′)∈(R1∪R3)\(R1∩R3):x=x′
δ(x, x′)
= dδ(R1, R3)
as required by between-additivity.
3 Properties of notions of preference dissimilarity
that give rise to between-additive distances.
It is of interest to identify the properties of qualitative notions of prefer-
ences dissimilarity that can be numerically represented by between-additive
functions. In this section, we provide an imperfect attempt in this direction.
Our attempt starts with an underlying notion of dissimilarity taking the
form of a quaternary relation Q on C or, alternatively, a binary relation on
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C × C. We interpret the statement (R1, R2) Q (R3, R4) as meaning that
preference R1 is weakly more dissimilar from R2 than R3 is from R4. A
corresponding interpretation is given to the comparative statements made
with QA (strictly more dissimilar) and QS (equally dissimilar). We restrict
attention to primitive notions of dissimilarity that satisfy the following ax-
ioms.
Axiom 1 Ordering. Q is an ordering of C × C.
Axiom 2 Symmetry. For all R,R′ ∈ C, (R,R′) Q (R′, R).
Axiom 3 Strict recording of distinctiveness. For all distinct R,R′ ∈ C,
(R,R′) QA (R,R).
Axiom 4 Perfect similarity for identical preferences. For all R,R′ ∈
C, (R,R) Q (R′, R′).
Axiom 5 Segmental Betweenness Consistency. For all preferences
R1, R2, R3, R
1
, R
2
and R
3 ∈ C such that R2 ∈ B(R1, R3) and R2 ∈ B(R1, R3),
one must have:
(i) (R1, R2) Q (R
1
, R
2
) and (R
1
, R
3
) Q (R1, R3) =⇒ (R2, R3) Q (R2, R3)
and
(ii) (R1, R2) QA (R
1
, R
2
) and (R
1
, R
3
) Q (R1, R3) or (R1, R2) Q (R
1
, R
2
)
and (R
1
, R
3
) QA (R
1, R3) =⇒ (R2, R3) QA (R2, R3)
The properties captured by Axioms 1-4 are quite intuitive when ap-
plied to a notion of qualitative dissimilarity between preferences (or for that
matter to any objects). The ordering Axiom just says that a dissimilarity
comparative statement can be made for any two pairs of preferences. It also
requires, through transitivity, that these comparative statements be con-
sistent with each other. The symmetry requirement is also natural when
applied to statements about dissimilarities of objects. A bit strong, but
nonetheless natural, is also the requirement for two distinct preferences to
be strictly more dissimilar than any one of the two preferences duplicated.
There is indeed a strong presumption that there would be no-dissimilarity
whatsoever between one preference and itself. Axiom 4 makes this presump-
tion formal.
The only axiom that is worth discussing a bit more is the requirement
that dissimilarity statements about pairs of preferences be "segmentally con-
sistent" with the notion of betweenness provided by Deﬁnition 1. It basically
imposes that the dissimilarity between any two preferences and any two
other preference to be endowed with a "segmental looking" structure with
respect to the betweenness notion. Consider indeed two preferences, and
consider a preference that is between these two. One can view these three
preferences as lying on some segment, the end point of which being the two
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extreme preferences, and the middle point being the intermediate prefer-
ence. Axiom 5 requires that all such segments made of three preferences,
one lying between the two others be ordered by the quaternary relation in a
way that respect their "segmental" nature. That is, if one segment of three
preferences is longer than another, then it is impossible to have an oppo-
site rankings of all pairs of sub-segments of the two segments. This is, in
substance, what Axiom 5 requires. It is important to observe that, among
other things, Axiom 5 requires the quaternary relation Q to be consistent
with betweenness in the sense that the dissimilarity between any two dis-
tinct preferences R1 and R2 be strictly larger than the dissimilarity between
either of R1 or R2 and any preference that lies strictly between them. We
state this formally as follows.
Lemma 4 If Q is a quaternary relation on C that satisﬁes Axioms 1 - 5,
then, for any preferences R1, R2 and R3 such that R2 ∈ B(R1, R3), one has
(R1, R3) QA (R
1, R2) and (R1, R3) QA (R
2, R3).
Proof. Suppose that R1, R2 and R3 are three preferences such that R2 ∈
B(R1, R3). We only show that (R1, R3) QA (R1, R2) must hold (the argu-
ment being similar for (R1, R3) QA (R
2, R3)). Assume by contradiction that
(R1, R3) QA (R
1, R2) does not hold. Since by Axiom 1 Q (as a binary rela-
tion on C × C) is, one must have (R1, R2) Q (R1, R3). If we now apply the
Clause (i) of Axiom 5 to the case where the preferences R
1
, R
2
and R
3
men-
tioned in this Axiom are, respectively, R1, R2 and R2, one concludes that
(R2, R2) Q (R2, R3). But this is contradicts Axiom 3 since, by Deﬁnition of
strict betweenness, R2 and R3 are distinct.
As an ordering on the set C × C, a quaternary relation Q can be numer-
ically represented by a function d : C × C → R having the property that
(R1, R2) Q (R3, R4) ⇐⇒ d(R1, R2) ≥ d(R3, R4) for any two pairs (R1, R2)
and (R3, R4) of preferences. It is not diﬃcult to see (see e.g. Krantz, Luce,
Suppes, and Tversky (1971), Vol. 2, ch. 14, Theorem 1) that the function d
can be chosen to take positive real values and be such that d(R1, R2) = 0 if
and only if R1 = R2. Moreover, since it numerically represents a symmet-
ric quaternary relation Q by Axiom 2, d will be a symmetric function as
well. As shown in Theorem 14 of Vol 2 of Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tver-
sky (1971), we can also without loss of generality require d to satisfy the
so-called "triangle inequality" that d(R,R′′) ≤ d(R,R′) + d(R′, R′′) for any
three preferences R, R′ and R′′. However, as noticed in Remark 3, the only
role played by the Triangle inequality in this paper is to establish the neces-
sity of the between-additivity of the distance function that a majoritarian
preference systematically minimizes.
However, while Axioms 1-5 are clearly necessary for admitting a nu-
merical representation that is between-additive, they are not suﬃcient for
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that purpose. We now provide a set of suﬃcient conditions for the desired
numerical representation.
We do this partly by imposing structural properties on the quaternary
relation Q that guarantee the possibility of segmentally measuring dissimi-
larity along the lines introduced already by Axiom 5. Imagine in eﬀect that
the comparative dissimilarities of two pairs of preferences, say (R1, R2) and
(R3, R4), could be matched exactly by the dissimilarity between two pref-
erences and some preference lying between them. Speciﬁcally, suppose that,
for the preferences R1, R2, R3 and R4, there are preferences R, R′ and R′′
such that R′′ ∈ B(R,R′), (R,R′′) QS (R1, R2) and (R′′, R′) QS (R3, R4).
This means that the dissimilarities of the pairs (R1, R2) and (R3, R4) are
measured by two "adjacent" segments along a "line" connecting R and R′
and passing trough some intermediate preference R′′. The property we are
about to introduce imposes some existential restrictions on the possibility
of measuring on a line in this fashion dissimilarity. It does not assume that
this possibility exists for any two pairs of preferences. But it does require
that when this possibility exists for speciﬁc dissimilarity comparisons, it also
exists for others. Before introducing this property, we formally deﬁne what
we mean by dissimilarity measurement "along a line".
Deﬁnition 6 The dissimilarity of two pairs of preferences (R1, R2) and
(R3, R4) is said to be compared along the line (R,R′′), which we denote
by (R1, R2) ◦L (R3, R4) = (R,R′′), if there exists some R′ ∈ B(R,R′′)
with R′ = R and R′ = R′′ such that (R,R′) QS (R1, R2) and (R′, R′′) QS
(R3, R4).
From a formal point of view, the possibility of comparing the dissimilarity
of two pairs of preferences along a line deﬁnes a binary operation ◦L on the
set C × C or, equivalently, a function from (C × C)× (C × C) to C × C.
This function is not empty because there are many pairs of preferences (R1,
R2) and (R3, R4) whose dissimilarity can be compared in this fashion. In
eﬀect, and trivially, any pair of preferences (R1, R2) and (R3, R4) such that
R2 = R3 ∈ B(R1, R4) has this property. However the binary operation ◦L is
not deﬁned for all pairs of preferences in R × C . Indeed, since X is ﬁnite,
there are only ﬁnitely many pairs in C × C. One of these pairs - ( R, R”) say
- is therefore maximally dissimilar in the sense that ( R, R”) Q (R,R′) for
any two preferences R and R′ in C. It would then be clearly impossible with
a quaternary relation Q satisfying Axioms 1-5 to compare the dissimilarity
of ( R, R”) and any pair (R3, R4) of two distinct preferences along some line
(R,R′′). Indeed, suppose that such a comparison was possible. This would
imply the existence of a pair (R,R′′) of distinct preferences such that ( R, R”)
QS (R,R
′) and (R3, R4) QS (R′, R′′) for some preference R′ ∈ B(R,R′′). But
since ( R, R”) is maximally dissimilar, one must have ( R, R”) Q (R,R′′). If
Q satisﬁes Axiom 5, then one has by Lemma 4 that (R,R′′) Q (R,R′) QS
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( R, R”). It would then follow from transitivity that (R,R′) QS (R,R′′). But
this can only happens by Lemma 4 if R′ = R. But this, given Axioms 3 and
4, contradicts the fact that ( R, R”) QS (R,R′) and that ( R, R”) is the most
dissimilar pair in R × R.
Since the binary operation ◦L is not deﬁned on the whole set (C ×
C)× (C × C), we denote by D◦L the domain of deﬁnition of ◦L. Hence,
D◦L = {(R1, R2, R3, R4) ∈ (C × C× C × C) : ∃ R, R′ and R′′ ∈ C satisfying
R′ ∈ B(R,R′′) such that (R1, R2) QS (R,R′) and (R3, R4) QS (R′, R′′)}.
We now impose three conditions on the quaternary relation Q which
ensure that the set of pairs of preferences that can be compared along a
line - in the sense of the binary operation ◦L- is suﬃciently rich. The ﬁrst
condition is existential. It is stated as follows.
Condition 1 For any preferences R1, R2, R3, R4 for which there are pref-
erences R, R′ and R′′ such that R′ ∈ B(R,R′′), (R,R′) QS (R1, R2) and
(R′, R′′) QS (R
3, R4), if (R1, R2) Q (R5, R6) for some preferences R5 and
R6, then there are preferences R, R
′
and R
′′
such that R
′ ∈ B(R,R′′), (R,R′)
QS (R
5, R6) and (R
′
, R
′′
) QS (R
3, R4).
In words, this condition just requires that if two pairs of preferences
(R1, R2) and (R3, R4) can be compared - on their basis of their relative
dissimilarity - along some line, then so can the pairs of preferences (R5, R6)
and (R3, R4) for any pair of preferences (R5, R6) that are not strictly more
dissimilar than (R1, R2).
The next condition is also existential. It is stated as follows.
Condition 2 For any preferences R1, R2, R3, R4 such that (R1, R2) QA
(R3,R4), there must exist preferences R5 and R6 for which there are prefer-
ences R, R
′
and R
′′
such that R
′ ∈ B(R,R′′), (R,R′) QS (R3, R4), (R′, R′′)
QS (R
5, R6) and (R1, R2) Q (R,R
′′
).
In plain English, this condition say that if two preferences (R1, R2) are
strictly more dissimilar than (R3, R4), then one can ﬁnd a pair of preferences
R5 and R6 that can be compared with (R3, R4) along some line (R,R”)
whose endpoints are not strictly more dissimilar than (R1, R2). In short,
if the preferences (R1, R2) are strictly more dissimilar than (R3, R4), then
there is a pair of preferences R5 and R6 whose dissimilarity, when "added"
to that of (R3, R4) along some segment (R,R
′′
), would still preserve the
greater dissimilarity of (R1, R2) vis-à-vis the end point of the line segment
(R,R”).
Condition 3 For any preferences R1, R2, R3, R4 for which there are pref-
erences R, R′ and R′′ such that R′ ∈ B(R,R′′), (R,R′) QS (R1, R2) and
(R′, R′′) QS (R
3, R4), if R5 and R6 are preferences for which there are pref-
erences R, R′ and R′′ such that R′ ∈ B( R, R′′), ( R, R′) QS (R,R′′) and
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( R′, R′′) QS (R5, R6), then there must be preferences R, R′ and R′′ and
R, R
′
and R
′′
satisfying R′ ∈ B( R, R′′), R′ ∈ B(R,R′′) such that ( R, R′)
QS (R
3, R4), ( R′, R′′) QS (R5, R6), (R,R′) QS (R1, R2) and (R′, R′′) QS
( R, R′′). Moreover, one must have that ( R, R′′) QS (R,R′′).
In words, this condition imposes some consistency in the possibilities
of measuring the dissimilarities of the three pairs of preferences (R1, R2),
(R3, R4) and (R5, R6) sequentially. If it is possible to measure these three
pairs ﬁrst along the line (R,R′′) (for (R1, R2) and (R3, R4)) and then along
the line ( R, R′′) (for (R,R′′) and (R3, R4) and it is also possible to measure
those thee same pairs ﬁrst along the line ( R, R′′) (for (R3, R4) and (R5, R6)),
and then along the line (R,R
′′
) (for (R1, R2) and ( R, R′′), then the end points
of the two lines along which the sequential measurement procedure has been
performed (namely ( R, R′′) and (R,R′′)) should be equally dissimilar.
As it happens, a preference similarity quaternary relation Q satisfying
these three conditions along with Axioms 1 - 5 can be numerically repre-
sented by a Between-additive distance function that may or may not satisfy
the Triangle inequality. We establish this in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Let Q be a quaternary relation on X (or a binary relation on
X×X) that satisﬁes Axioms 1 - 5 and Conditions 1-3. Then, there exists a
between-additive function d : C × C −→ R+ satisfying Properties (i)-(iii) of
Deﬁnition 5 (but not necessarily the Triangle inequality) such that, for any
four complete binary relations R1, R2, R3 and R4 on X, one has (R1, R2)
Q (R3, R4)⇐⇒ d(R1, R2) ≥ d(R3, R4).
Proof. The proof rides (heavily) on Theorem 3 at p. 85 of Vol 1 of Krantz,
Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971). We ﬁrst show that the quadruple (C × C, Q,D◦L◦L)
is what these authors call (Deﬁnition 3bet, p. 84) an extensive structure with
no essential maximum. This amount to show that:
(1) Q is an ordering of C × C (which it is!).
(2) If (R1, R2, R3, R4) ∈ D◦L and ((R1, R2) ◦L ( R3, R4), R5, R6) ∈
D◦Lthen (R3, R4, R5, R6) ∈ D◦L , (R1, R2, ( R3, R4) ◦L (R5, R6)) ∈ D◦L
and ((R1, R2) ◦L ( R3, R4), R5, R6) QS (R1, R2, ( R3, R4) ◦L (R5, R6)). This
property is an immediate consequence of Condition 3.
(3) lf (R1, R2, R3, R4) ∈ D◦L and if (R1, R2) Q (R5, R6) for some prefer-
ences R5 and R6, then (R3, R4, R5, R6) ∈ D◦Land (R1, R2) ◦L (R3, R4) Q
(R3, R4) ◦L (R5, R6). The ﬁrst part of this property is an immediate con-
sequence of Condition 1. The second part of the property results at once
from segmental betweenness consistency applied to the pairs of preferences
(R1, R2) ◦L (R3, R4) and (R3, R4) ◦L (R5, R6).
(4) If R1, R2, R3 and R4 are preferences for which (R1, R2) QA (R
3,R4),
then there must exist preferences R5 and R6 such that (R3, R4, R5, R6) ∈
D◦L and such that (R1, R2) Q ((R3, R4) ◦L (R5, R6)). This is secured by
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Condition 2.
(5) lf (R1, R2, R3, R4) ∈ D◦L , then (R1, R2) ◦L (R3, R4) QA (R1, R2). This
is an immediate consequence of the deﬁnition of ◦Land Lemma 4.
(6) If a sequence (R,R′)n (for n = 1, ..., and two preferences R and R′)
can be recursively deﬁned by (R,R′)1 = (R,R′) ◦L (R, R′) and (R,R′)n =
(R,R′)n−1 for any n = 2, ... and is such that there exists a pair of prefer-
ences R and R
′
such that (R,R
′
) Q (R,R′)n for any n in the sequence, then
this sequence should be ﬁnite. This (Archimedean) axiom is satisﬁed here in
our ﬁnite setting.
Hence, using Theorem 3 at p. 85 of Vol 1 of Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and
Tversky (1971), we conclude that there exists a function d : C × C →R+
such that (R1, R2) Q (R3, R4)⇐⇒ d(R1, R2) ≥ d(R3, R4) for any four com-
plete binary relations R1, R2, R3 and R4 on X. The function d inherits the
properties of Q and satisﬁes therefore Properties (i)-(iii) of Deﬁnition 5. We
know from the very same Theorem 3 of Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky
(1971) that d((R1, R2)◦L (R3, R4)) = d(R1, R2)+(R3, R4) for all preferences
(R1, R2, R3, R4) ∈ D◦L . Since any three preferences R1, R2 and R3 such that
R2 ∈ B(R1, R3) are obviously also such that (R1, R2, R2, R3) ∈ D◦L , this
also shows that d is between-additive.
Observe that Theorem 3 does not directly guarantee a numerical rep-
resentation of a qualitative notion of preference dissimilarity through a
between-additive distance function satisfying the Triangle inequality. How-
ever the Triangle inequality results from Between-additivity as established
in Lemma 11 above. Hence one can say that a Majoritarian preference min-
imizes the sum a numerical representation of a qualitative notion of prefer-
ences dissimilarities between itself and any proﬁle of preference under any
notion of preference dissimilarity satisfying Axioms 1 - 5 and Conditions
1-3. This, we believe, adds some generality to the analysis of this paper.
4 Conclusion
This paper has provided what we believe to be a signiﬁcant generalization
of a relatively little known argument in favour of the "preference of the ma-
jority" for collective decision making. We have shown, in eﬀect, that the
preference of the majority is representative of the collection of preferences
from which it emanates in the sense of minimizing the aggregate pairwise
dissimilarity between those preferences and itself for a reasonably general
notion of such pairwise dissimilarity. This property of the majoritarian rule
was known with respect to the Kemeny notion of distance in the case where
the majoritarian preference is transitive. We have shown that the property
holds true for a larger class of notions of preference dissimilarity, and for
preferences that need not be transitive. We have also identiﬁed a property
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- between-additivity - of a distance function representing the underlying
notion of dissimilarity that is necessary and suﬃcient for majority to be
representative in this sense sense. We have also provided an unsatisfactory
characterization of an ordinal notion of preference dissimilarity that can
be numerically represented by such a between-additive distance function.
Our characterization is unsatisfactory because it rides on three unnecessary
structural assumptions that may be diﬃcult to verify in practice. We there-
fore believe that obtaining a more satisfactory characterization of a notion
of preference dissimilarity that is numerically representable by a between-
additive distance is a well-worth objective for future research.
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